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On the Possibility of Formless Life: 
Agamben’s Politics of the Gesture*
René ten Bos
abstract Human activity is routinely thought of in terms of form and teleology. In the first section, it is argued that
this is due to the spell of Plato and Aristotle. In the second section, Agamben’s struggle to evade 
teleological schemes is discussed. He argues for a politics of the gesture. This is a politics that blurs 
entrenched distinctions between the human and the non-human and therefore opens a perspective to a 
communality that questions not only positivist anthropology but also, and in relation to this, teleology.
Introduction
Many philosophers, scientists, and intellectuals have argued that work or labour is a pre­
eminently human characteristic. That is, we differ from animals because our actions can 
be designed as if there were a goal attached to it. Work, Georg Lukàcs (1973) once 
argued, is ‘teleological positioning’ (‘teleologische Setzung’) and I believe that most 
philosophers would somehow be in agreement with this. If activity loses its aim, it is no 
longer seen as work.
As a consequence, work is generally located in an atmosphere of objectivity and 
necessity. Working persons are not ordinary subjects anymore but have become, so to 
speak, objectified subjects: they act in conformity with rules and regulations rather than 
according to their own creative desires. They subject themselves to well-determined 
roles for they understand that this is the best guarantee to acquire means of existence. 
Work is routinely couched in rigid forms. We have lost the ability not to think about 
human activity in terms of organization. Reflections about work and organization run 
the risk of becoming senseless and irrelevant when elements such as form, goal, 
differentiation, efficiency, or coordination are lacking. It is even worse than this: such 
reflections do not only ignore economic or industrial essentials but also human ones. It 
is “a basic characteristic of human beings”, argues John Rawls (1971: 523), that
* Thanks are due to Steffen Böhm, Charlie Gere, Ruud Kaulingfreks, Henk Oosterling, and two 
anonymous reviewers of this journal.
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no one person can do everything that he might do; nor a fortiori can he do everything that any 
other person can do. The potentialities of each individual are greater than those he can hope to 
realize; and they fall far short from the powers among men generally. (Rawls, 1971: 523)
And who would dare to disagree with this? There are always so many possibilities that 
remain unfulfilled were it not that people start working together. According to Rawls, 
organization, training, and planning offer the sole prospect of realizing at least some of 
all these dormant possibilities. In fact, they even help us to overcome our anger and 
frustration with all that seems so unrealisable.
Yet, there is something nagging about this. Work, it is true, may help us to realize the 
otherwise unrealisable, but what is the price to be paid for this? To realize the 
unrealisable people have to divide work and the problem is that this division of work 
cannot be achieved without a division of their very selves. Put simply, the organization 
of labour cannot be detached from the organization of human beings. This has profound 
consequences for the communities to which they belong. These become communities of 
identities, functions, classes, and exclusions. These are communities based on 
separations.
Can human activity be thought of as formless, inclusive, integral? In the first section of 
the paper, I shall maintain that reflections about the subject hardly ever escape from the 
tyranny of timeless form. That is, they either follow a ‘Platonic principle’ or an 
‘Aristotelian principle’. According to both principles, the very idea of formless activity 
is meaningless. But is it? In the second section, I will discuss the concept of a gesture as 
it is developed by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. He introduces this concept 
as an alternative to Aristotelian conceptions of human activity that are, in his view, 
always related to means-end schemes. The concept of the gesture radically breaks with 
these schemes. The gesture, Agamben maintains, is a means without an end. Hence, the 
gesture refers to a formless kind of life that allows for a community (polis) without 
entrenched identities, functions, and exclusions. Agamben offers us the possibility of a 
politics of the gesture. What are we to make out of this?
The Shadow of Teleology: Plato and Aristotle
Plato
Plato understood that the division of labour in the state he logically constructed could 
only be successful if  linked to the separation of the community in corresponding classes. 
The person who produces belongs to a class of producers (shoemakers, weavers, 
farmers are the preferred examples); the person who fights belongs to a class of fighters 
(soldiers, warriors); and the person who rules belongs to a class of rulers (philosophers). 
So already here, in a work that has been argued to have laid the foundation of Western 
philosophy, we have a technical and more philosophical justification of the division of 
labour. It is only through specialization and professionalism that we can make more 
than we would achieve otherwise (which is the technical justification). Specialization 
and professionalism are also perfect responses to people obviously having different 
natural aptitudes (which is the philosophical justification). In Plato’s logical universe,
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every talent deserves its own specific function. Indeed, this is regarded as a matter of 
justice and not doing what is in accordance to your natural talents is deemed to be a 
gross violation of this justice (Plato, 1971: 347a-347b).
Plato’s trust in a state run by specialists is not innocent at all, as has been pointed out by 
many commentators, since it is to be understood as nothing less that an attack on 
Athenian democracy. A timeless and therefore incorruptible class division was 
proffered by Plato as an indispensable alternative to what he could only understand as 
chaos and weakness. His objections to democracy are crystalline clear. Admittedly, 
democracy is attractive for it has to offer many different colours. Sometimes, it seems as 
if all the colours are shown off in the shops and that is, according to Plato, a blessing for 
women and children (1971: 557c). He links democracy to what we nowadays would 
consider as immoderate consumption. Such consumption is nice for the masses (most 
notably, women and children) but disastrous for a state that has to wage war on enemies 
in order to gain wealth (which is, of course, a really masculine activity). Democracy 
lacks coercion and authority, respect and rightness. More importantly, it lacks sense for 
truth and transparency amongst its political leaders.
In the preface of my English edition of The Republic, the translator argues that Plato’s 
alternative for democracy is a kind of totalitarian aristocracy in which positions are 
determined by talent rather than by blood. If we are to coin modern terminology for 
what Plato envisaged, then ‘management meritocracy’ (1971: 50) would, at least 
according to my translator, be a serious candidate. Now, this is, of course, based on an 
intolerable trans-historical understanding of Plato who was, after all, not a management 
author avant la lettre -  but it makes one thing very clear: in a well-ordered society, 
human interaction is determined by unshakeable technical and social distinctions. Plato 
is not a management thinker but managers are clearly enthralled by what Marx referred 
to as ‘the Platonic principle’. This is based on an understanding of the all-importance of 
time:
So do we do better to exercise one skill or to try to practice several?
To stick to one, he said.
And there is a further point. It is fatal in any job to miss the right moment for action.
Clearly.
The workman must be a professional at the call of his job; his job will not wait till he has leisure to
spare for it.
That is inevitable.
Quantity and quality are therefore more easily produced when a man specializes appropriately on a
single job for which he is naturally fitted, and neglects all the others. (Plato, 1971: 370bc)
Marx (1981: 387) captures the Platonic principle as follows: The workman should be 
directed (gerichtet, richten) towards the job. The reverse situation, that is, when the job 
is directed to the workman, is deemed to be hopelessly inefficient. Lack of 
specialization would allow the workman to carry out as many additional jobs as he 
likes. As a consequence, the job would ‘wait’ for a workman to be picked up and hence 
“the right time for production would be lost” (ibid.). Marx argues that the Platonic 
division of labour is governed by serious concerns about useful and useless time. As 
such it should not be related, he argues, to the city-state of Sparta that Plato admired so 
much but to class or caste system in ancient Egypt, the first industrial model state that 
we know. It is well known that Plato was an admirer of Egypt and that his ideas about
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the ideal state resonate with what he happened to know about the situation there (see 
also, for example, Popper, 2003: 242, 245-246). His image of Egypt was informed by a 
deep discontent with movement and change, exactly the kind of stuff that he bemoaned 
so much in the Athenian democracy where he lived. Social institutions, Plato contends, 
should be petrified in time as if they were to be denied any development of their own. 
Something similar was assumed with respect to the ‘natural aptitudes’ of the workman. 
A weaver is a weaver, a shoemaker a shoemaker, and a warrior a warrior, and all these 
people are involved not only in stupidity but also in injustice if they are deviating from 
the straight and narrow path that nature has laid down for them. Job enrichment would 
be something unheard of in Plato’s ideal state.
After Plato, real states have never been able to strictly follow his recipes. It is well 
known that his Sicilian experiments with the totalitarian state were doomed to fail. On 
the other hand, we should not derive too much optimism from Plato’s political failures. 
His ominous shadow has never been far away, not even in democratic territories. Marx 
(1981: 388), to mention just one of his heirs and critics, rather desperately asked 
himself: “Le platonisme, ou va-t-il se nicher?” (“Where will Platonism find its 
niche?”).
The great German philosopher had his suspicions. Organizations and companies have 
never been able to get rid of their platonic mainsprings. They are the self-declared 
figureheads of efficiency and hence have developed, like Plato himself, a distaste for 
loss of time. Perhaps, one might even say that the contemporary and fashionable 
discontent with bureaucratic inertia might be platonically inspired. It is this inertia that 
justifies so many people to argue that the entrepreneur, who is seen as the master of 
efficiency, should become a role model for the red tape (du Gay, 2000).
Simultaneously, however, the enterprise seems to represent the seamy side in the 
ongoing debates about the uncomfortable relationship between democracy and 
efficiency. A democrat differs from the entrepreneur or the manager in that he refuses to 
subject others to a temporal regime: he or she modestly accepts that the adjustment of 
people and time will never be perfect. In other words, s/he will never transmogrify time 
into a scarce resource that, depending on the circumstances, allows one to tie people 
down to a fixed place (Moore, 1963: 7). The managers in an enterprise fancy the idea to 
adjust time and space and indeed struggle to fix human beings to well-defined spaces 
that we can best understand as tiny boxes. These boxes are denied any dynamics of their 
own. Movement is only possible between them rather than in them and is restricted to 
clear and indisputable lines. The core of the platonic principle is that a human being and 
his or her ‘natural aptitudes’ are to be understood as forms or ideas that can never 
change. Experts who are appointed rather than chosen see to a correct allocation of 
boxes.
Aristotle
Aristotle takes issue with the kind of conceitedness that is characteristic of the Platonic 
principle. He was the first thinker who understood that Plato’s assumptions about the 
intrinsic relationship between the technical and social division of labour could not be 
taken for granted, let alone that it would in any way be sanctifying. Of course, Aristotle 
avers that logic and efficiency are important and that it is better when a person directs
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him- or herself to only one task (1984: 1237b), but he adds that a technical division of 
labour need not necessarily be linked to a social division of labour. Indeed, he insists 
that the question of linking both kinds of divisions is not a technical but rather a 
political matter:
[In setting up a state,]... a number of agricultural workers will be needed to supply food; and 
skilled workmen will be required, and fighting men, and wealthy men, and priests, and judges of 
what is necessary and expedient. This enumeration being finished, it remains to consider whether 
they should all take part in al these activities, everybody being farmer and skilled workman and 
deliberator and judge (for this is not impossible) -  or shall we postulate different persons for each 
task? Or again, are not some of the jobs necessarily confined to some people, while other may be 
thrown open to all? The situation is not the same in every constitution; fo r .i t  is equally possible 
for all to share in everything and for some to share in some things. These features are what makes 
the constitution different: in democracies all share in all things, in oligarchies the opposing 
practice prevails. (Aristotle, 1984: 414-415 or 1328b)
Aristotle argues that in the democratic city state citizens are able to carry out many 
different kind of functions. He assumes that these citizens have sufficient ‘virtue’ to 
carry out the many different kind of tasks that belong to a gentleman’s life. If they live 
theirs in a ‘mechanical or commercial’ way, they would simply ‘militate against virtue’. 
I will not enter here into the issue of virtuousness. My point is rather that Aristotle was 
perhaps the first philosopher who came to understand that the wealth that results from 
the division of labour might have a very strained relationship with particular social 
demands. This is why, in his exemplary study on Aristotelian elements in contemporary 
managements and economies, James Murphy labels the Greek philosopher as a 
precursor of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx for they all understood that 
history hides a tragedy in the sense that the material liberation of the human being 
somehow seems to require his or her spiritual subjugation:
The inexorably growing division of labour is a Promethean tale of how the destruction of the 
individual leads to the prosperity of the species. (Murphy, 1993: 25)
The necessity of labour undermines human freedom. In one of his fantastic footnotes, 
Marx (1981: 387) points out that all philosophical sympathy for the division of labour 
could not prevent the citizens of Athens from celebrating the ideal of ‘autarky’: political 
freedom and independence (autarcheia) were held in higher esteem than wealth. Now 
we know that it is hard to think of a political or social philosophy that does not address 
the fact that technology seems to be devoted to the species rather than the individual. 
Aristotle (1999: 322-324) was the first thinker who problematised this. In the last pages 
of his Nicomachean Ethics, to be more precise, in chapter 7 and 8 of the tenth book, he 
extensively elaborates on the concept of autarky. The most perfect activity of a human 
being belies any relationship or coordination and is, at least in this sense, truly divine.
Two remarks need to be made here. First, the Aristotelian focus on activity can be seen 
as a correction of the Platonic focus on production; so, it is in the Aristotelian scheme of 
things that the emphasis lies on practical wisdom (phronesis) rather than on knowledge 
(episteme) or expertise (techne). Second, Aristotle links the activity of autarcheia to 
theorising, thinking, and contemplating rather than to production or scientific labour. 
The point that I want to put forward here is that the Aristotelian idea of perfect activity
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cannot be related to production, coordination or the division of labour. It belies the very 
idea of boxes. Or so it seems.
Rawls (1971) speaks of the ‘Aristotelian principle’ which he understands as a basic 
principle concerning human motivation. As indicated above, Aristotle assumes that 
there is an innate good in each human being, a good, moreover, that is superior to their 
very selves in that it directs their actions to some ultimate good (1999: 310, 1173a). 
That Aristotle thinks of this innate good in terms of an instinct that brings the human 
being into touch with the divine as a formative principle is relevant here. Even a 
contemporary thinker as Rawls argues that this principle allows the human being to 
attain for something higher, even though he does not link it so much to the divine as to 
the reasonable and the good. Insofar as the division of labour frustrates these high- 
spirited intentions of the person, it should be condemned as unreasonable and perhaps 
even as evil.
Rawls rephrases the Aristotelian principle as an intuitive idea with two elements:
a) The more people improve their performance when carrying out certain tasks, the 
more they enjoy what they do;
b) If they have to choose between two activities, then they will generally prefer the 
one that calls on “a larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle 
discriminations” (Rawls, 1971: 426).
Lurking behind these elements is the thought that complex activities are more pleasant 
because they “satisfy the desire for variety and novelty of experience” (1971: 427). 
Here, Rawls emphasizes the importance of anticipation, surprise, personal style, and 
expression, all elements that we would not associate with the Platonic principle 
discussed earlier. The point is that these elements become irrelevant when one is to 
carry out highly specialized and rather simple tasks. The Aristotelian principle explains 
why it is that people are motivated to carry out complex rather than simple tasks, why it 
is that they want to exercise at least some influence on what they have to do and also 
why it is that their desires change over the years. I submit that this emphasis on change 
and dynamics in motivational patterns of human beings is the most important 
Aristotelian correction of the management meritocracy that Plato had in mind. Rather 
than resting petrified in Plato’s ideal state, the human being is now envisaged as a lover 
of complexity, self-improvement, and more or less radical innovation.
However, Rawls points out that the Aristotelian principle is not universally applicable. 
He alerts us to the risks that are involved with complex tasks, to the learning process 
that can become as tedious as they are fruitless, and also to all kinds of social and 
psychological inhibitions. As a matter of fact, Aristotle was well aware of these 
problems. When it comes to work, one has to accept the obvious fact that not everybody 
will be capable of actualising his or her potential. Having said this however, it seems to 
be that the strive for actualisation is more intense than ever (ten Bos and Rhodes, 2003). 
We may wonder whether this should be something that we are to endorse and whether 
we should not opt for a somewhat moderated version of the Aristotelian principle. Why 
would everyone engage in the game of ever increasing complexity and subtlety? A 
certain nostalgic craving for simplicity and even for non-activity does not seem to be
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unwelcome at all. However, such musings notwithstanding, it is the full-blown 
Aristotelian principle that has become widely accepted. Even Rawls, who has doubts 
about it, allows for the fact that the principle fits in with our nature to such an extent 
“that in the design to social institutions a large place has to be made for it, otherwise 
human beings will find their culture and form of life dull and empty” (Rawls, 1971: 
429).
In our culture, dullness and emptiness is, no doubt, the worst that can happen to a 
human being. In the philosophical talk show Das philosophische Quartett, broadcasted 
by German television on the 16th of February 2003, Rüdiger Safranski, a well-known 
German philosopher, claimed that the core problem of our entire civilization, our culture 
and our education is to prevent that human beings, when they become older, will be 
bored stiff. That is why we should have them read newspapers or watch television, and, 
most important of all, have them do some decent job. Emptiness and boredom are 
omnipresent enemies for a life that is there to be enjoyed, also on the job, indeed, 
especially on the job. The well-known Greek fear for emptiness is still very much with 
us today.
Rawls is a case in point. He invokes the image of a chain of activities in which n is an 
activity that implies all the kind of skills that are necessary to carry out activity n-1 and 
some more skills added to this. The further you are on this chain, the more likely it is 
that enjoyment and happiness will prevail. Hence, the Aristotelian principle assumes 
that human nature always has a tendency to become less empty and to move onwards 
along the chain of activities that is life. We are all fastened to this chain.
O f course, we do not have to accept this story. It smacks of implacable teleology: no 
matter how difficult it sometimes is, in the end all work aims at the achievement of 
happiness and virtuousness (which are, in the Aristotelian scheme, inextricably linked). 
We only have to look at the behaviour of those who apparently have arrived at the full 
actualisation of their potential, that is, at the idiosyncrasies of leaders in business and 
politics to understand that teleology might boil down to a false promise. But even so, 
Rawls seems to have a point when he states that the Aristotelian principle seems to 
express nothing less than a “deep psychological fact” (1971: 432) that, in combination 
with rational planning and an understanding of the world as it is, accounts for many of 
our judgments. Put more straightforwardly, in our culture many people think that it 
works like this. We all seem to plan with a certain goal in mind. Of course, sometimes 
we come to an understanding that not everything in life can be planned, but a life 
without telos is deemed to be unacceptable. I have said that The Aristotelian principle 
differs from the Platonic one in that it allows for some movement and dynamics, but 
these new dynamics is carefully designed and not at all the same as agility or liveliness. 
What we have to do over time is very well organized. The community of human beings 
is directed towards happiness and virtuousness.
Rawls has his doubts. Sure, you have to adjust the design of your institutions to the state 
of affairs as Aristotle might have seen them, but to what extent? Is the Aristotelian 
principle irrefutably ‘good’ or ‘true’? What kind of people do we get when they only 
think in terms of future realizations or actualisations? Will they not think that 
everything that belongs to the past, their past, is stupid or boring? Is the past only a way
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through to what in the end will turn out to be a success? And have we really laid down 
our adherence to the Platonic principle? Or is it more that we have adopted a hybrid 
position between the two principles, one that faces the temptation of dynamics but 
refuses to accept it as such? Is not what we are left with a kind of movement that is 
restricted because it is so well ordered? In our society, Kingwell (1998) explains, most 
people long for happiness, even those who work in organizations, but who of them is 
willing to go for happiness without relying on recipe and technique? Success needs to 
be certain. It should therefore be carefully extracted from organized and purposeful 
work. This is what Plato and Aristotle, for all their differences, would agree on.
Can we escape from their shadows? Is it possible to conceive of work or activity in a 
way that evades the teleological scheme? Is it possible to relate them to formlessness? It 
is to these questions that I will turn now.
Non-Teleological Activity: The Gesture
The Anthropological Machine
The French philosopher Michel Serres (1987: 132-133) has argued that work is always a 
struggle against noise. If  you let the things in the world fend for themselves, then foxes 
will eat the poultry, aphids will destroy the vine, and the canals will be filled with mud. 
Without work, everything gets blurred. In this sense, Serres points out, work is not 
related to human beings. Life is always a struggle against the endless flow. Order, 
isolation, and organization are the weapons of life itself against the omnipresent 
tendency towards formlessness.
So, Serres doubts whether work is the defining human characteristic. Animals work, 
plants work, everything works. But if  work does not define humanity, what does? In a 
book called The Open: Man and Animal Agamben (2002) has claimed that the 
separation of the human from the animal is, if  anything, based on a constitutive political 
act rather than based on a hard-boiled anthropological fact. In his entire work, Agamben 
therefore refuses to offer us a positivist anthropology that would indicate how and why 
human beings differ from non-humans. He argues that this distinction is based on a 
politically inspired formula:
[H]omo sapiens is neither a substance nor a well-defined species: the formula is rather a machine 
or an artefact in order to produce knowledge of the humane. (Agamben, 2002: 37)2
So, what we have here is an anthropological machine which ironically “lays bare the 
absence of a distinguishing feature of the human being” (2002: 39). This machine or 
this formula is a historical invention after which humans can envisage their own being 
as merely ‘anthropomorphic’. Human beings are, in other words, animals that resemble 
the human being. But if  in this way human beings lack an essence or telos of their own, 
then they are, according to Agamben, not only human but also profoundly non-human.
2 In subsequent passages, I have not always used English texts. The translations into English are mine.
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The human being is a formless creature that has never been able to escape from its own 
bestiality or inhumanity.
At the end of a discussion about Pico della Mirandelo, Agamben (2002: 40) submits that 
it is for his or her inhumanity that the human being can assume many different 
characteristics and faces. Man is, in other words, chameleonic. Humanism, Agamben 
adds, is therefore paradoxically based on the discovery of the non-human in humanity. 
As such it is, in words of Peter Sloterdijk (who is appreciatively quoted by Agamben, 
2002: 84) in the business of ‘domesticating’ the alien element in itself. “What presents 
itself as reflection about politics”, writes Sloterdijk, “is in truth a fundamental reflection 
about the rules for the business of the human park. If there is a dignity of the human 
being..., then it is especially because human beings are not only kept in the political 
theme park, but are also keeping themselves there” (2001: 331). We are therefore the 
animals who have the capacity to keep themselves and we can do this only if we are 
able to recognize the non-human as an immanence in ourselves. The possibility to be-in- 
a-park requires an understanding of what it would be not to be in a park. Outside the 
park is an unruly hell. Inside it, you have goals, rules, laws, organization, and so on. 
Teleology is omnipresent in the park.
The idea to keep human beings in a park is, as Sloterdijk maintains, essentially political, 
and I think that Agamben would agree wholeheartedly with this. He points out that 
humanity claims to have a mandate for the integral management of its own bestiality 
(2002: 86). However, he does not write about the human beast in a park but about the 
human beast in and, more importantly, outside the polis. As is well known, Aristotle 
defined the human being as a zoon politikon (political animal). This implies that only a 
human being can be in the polis. What is outside the polis is what one might refer to as 
the less-than-human. It has no other dimensions than bestiality and physicality. In other 
words, these dimensions were not frequently politicised in Greece.
One of Agamben’s major claims is that it is exactly these dimensions that became a 
strategic objective for modern politics. This is why modern politics is essentially a bio­
politics. (Indeed, with hindsight one might say that the Greek treatment of barbarians, 
slaves and women were an instance of bio-politics as well. Foucault is therefore wrong 
in claiming that bio-politics is a modern phenomenon. His claim was right to the extent 
that it alerted us to the exceptionality of bio-politics in the Ancient world.) Modern 
politics no longer focuses primarily on humanity as a well-defined form (citizen, king, 
employee, functionary, president, and so on) but increasingly also on the less-than- 
human (life itself, bare life, bodily life, animal life). Agamben writes more or less 
extensively about animals, children, embryos, the proletariat of modern cities, angels, 
drifters, comatose patients, refugees, prisoners, inmates of concentration camps, indeed, 
about death itself. Put otherwise, he writes about anthropomorphic creatures that 
somehow have not actualised their fully-fledged human form or have lost their form.
In this sense, his work seems to resonate particularly well with a number of recent 
studies in history or in art history about extreme violence that renders people formless, 
wordless, or faceless. Krauss and Alain-Bois (1997) have used Bataille’s concept of 
‘informe’ to discuss some scatological tendencies in modern or post-modern art. 
Groebner (2004) embroiders on the concept of the Ungestalt (formless) to discuss the
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way in which representations of extreme violence in the late Middle Ages are related to 
contemporary representations of the same (in film, in graffiti, and so on). His discussion 
is guided by some very ‘Agambenian’ questions: “How, then, was medieval violence 
portrayed, and how were the hideously injured bodies given a voice? What role did 
anonymity play? Finally, how was illegitimate, threatening violence distinguished from 
proper, ‘ordering’ violence?” (Groebner, 2004: 16). In the next subsection, we will see 
that Agamben thinks that ethics, as he understands it, is about giving a voice to the 
voiceless.
The Capacity to Die and the Capacity to Speak
The stakes of Agamben’s philosophy are enormous. To understand why we must briefly 
consider some of his intuitions about the relationship between death and language. The 
less-than-human is only alive and has no voice at all in the polis. This implies that it has 
no relationship to death for it is only the speaking animal (zoon logon echon) that has an 
idea of its own mortality. According to Agamben (1991: xi), it is philosophers like 
Hegel or Heidegger who have alerted us to the strange relationship between the human 
capacity to speak and the human capacity to die. In the words of Heidegger, only 
Dasein is being-to-death (Sein-zum-Tode). Anthropomorphic creatures -  be they 
animals or inmates of prison camps -  do not speak but are only living. They are, as it 
were, “immortal living things” (Derrida, 2003: 130; see also: Sloterdijk, 2000). In a 
sense, therefore, they cannot be killed because they, being unaware of their mortality, 
cannot die. Yet, they are killed. But since they cannot properly die, we can kill them, by 
dint of a sovereign act, unpunished (Agamben, 2002). In Heidegger’s famous words: we 
can make them “cease to live” (see also: Agamben, 1991: 2). This is what routinely 
happens to animals who are hunted, to comatose patients in hospitals where the plug is 
pulled out, or to refugees that are sent back to their lands of origin. Agamben wants us 
to understand that even in these situations we are actually talking about death and about 
killing. Such an understanding, however, assumes that the less-than-human gets a voice 
of its own. Only when they can speak, can they die. We may also, for example when we 
are unable to give them a voice, render ourselves voiceless. Only by making ourselves 
less-than-human can we hope to see the less-than-human. This might be the only chance 
that we, as humans, have.
What is excluded by the anthropological machine from the community of human beings 
takes central stage in Agamben’s work. To bear witness to the less-than-human is what 
Agamben understands as an ethical duty for human beings. As he explains in a deeply 
moving passage:
Just as in the starry sky that we see at night, the stars shine surrounded by a total darkness that, 
according to cosmologists, is nothing other than the testimony of a time in which the stars did not 
yet shine, so the speech of the witness bears witness to a time in which human beings did not yet 
speak; and so the testimony of human beings attests to a time in which they were not yet human. 
(Agamben, 1999a: 162)
Agamben’s entire work is about the (im)possibility of encounters with the less-than- 
human and, for him, this is in fact a question about the (im)possibility of ethics. This is 
by no means a settled question for we have to undertake some very difficult thinking. 
More precisely, we have to think of a community that includes whatever there is
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(Agamben, 1993), we have to think of a post-sovereign politics that does not exclude 
life (Agamben, 2002), and, indeed, we have to think of a language that is not just the 
vehicle of thought as such but that, in its openness to the voice of life itself, ultimately 
brings thought to a standstill (Agamben, 1991). In short, we may have to think the kind 
of thought that thinks nothing anymore. Only this might make encounters with the less- 
than-human possible. But this possibility should not be taken for granted. As Groebner 
(2004: 37) has it, it implies that we would really be able to see what we probably fear 
most.
Can we ever therefore really understand the (non)voice that speaks to us from the 
Muselmänner who were sent into the gas chambers? Immediately after the just quoted 
passage, Agamben elucidates how disturbing the ethical demand of an encounter with 
the less-than-human is:
Or, to take up an analogous hypothesis, just as in the expanding universe, the farthest galaxies 
move away from a speed greater than their light, which cannot reach us, such that the darkness we 
see in the sky is nothing but the invisibility of the light of unknown stars, so the complete witness 
(...) is the one we cannot see: the Muselmann. (ibid.)
Even if we abandon our claims to language, sovereignty, or humanity in order to see or 
hear the less-than-human, there is still the possibility that we see or hear nothing. 
Basically, this is what ethics is all about: to think a possibility that might prove to be 
impossible.
A Politics of the Gesture
It is against this backdrop that we should understand the concept of the gesture. 
Agamben invokes the idea of the gesture as an element of a coming politics that takes 
the body or the less-than-human as the starting point. But is this not the same as bio­
politics? Did not bio-politics depart from similar assumptions?
No, bio-politics can only think of the body in order to exclude it by an act of 
sovereignty. It is this sovereignty -  the very claim that we are positioned to end another 
creature’s life by excluding it from our community -  that is the starting point in bio­
politics. A politics of the gesture, on the other hand, wants to include the body, the 
physical, the less-than-human. It wants to undo the unholy effects of the anthropological 
machine that allows us to think in terms of humans and non-humans, in terms of 
represented and non-represented bodies, in terms of qualified life and bare life. Central 
to a politics of the gesture is an understanding that the concept of the human being is 
very insecure.
Only if we see this, may we lend an ear to a new politics, that is, a politics which 
subverts all claims to sovereignty and thus defies any legitimacy to the distinction 
between bare life on the one hand and the qualified life on the other. In terms I used 
earlier, this politics wants to overcome the distinction between a human life that has 
attained a perfect form and a life which somehow has not. It argues that, given the 
unstable nature of the anthropos, we should refrain from referring to this creature in 
terms of fixed essences evidencing his or her alleged sovereignty (the thinking animal, 
the political animal, or, indeed, the working animal).
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Agamben dreams of a politics which radically subverts this sovereignty. The problem 
with contemporary (pseudo-democratic) politics is, he argues, that it has become a 
media spectacle which cannot but expropriate our sense for community. Here, Agamben 
is a true follower of Guy Debord’s analysis of the society of the spectacle (Debord, 
1967). In this society, language is no longer able to forge communities. It rather 
transforms human beings in solitary atoms who are merely capable of absorbing images 
like commodities. “The extreme form of the expropriation of the communal is the 
spectacle, that is to say, the kind of politics in which we are living. But this also means 
that in the spectacle our linguistic nature meets us in the wrong form” (Agamben, 2001: 
81).
Against this, we need to reinvent a language that is a truly communal and non-exclusive 
language. This might entail that politics needs to be conceived of not so much as a 
process of talking (parlare, parliament) but as a politico-bodily practice. Such a practice 
does not assume that the talkative citizen is a standard unit of analysis but rather takes 
the body as its starting point. The new post-democratic practice that Agamben has in 
mind departs from an understanding of bodies. In the end, a gestural politics should 
enable the encounter between the human being and the less-than-human. What does 
Agamben expect of this new politics? In a crucial article, he quotes Max Kommerell, a 
German literary theorist who wrote about gestures in literature: “[A] new beauty begins, 
one that is similar to the beauty of the gestures of the animal, to soft and threatening 
gestures” (Agamben, 1999: 80).
What are we to make of this new beauty? Agamben does not have in mind a new kind 
of aesthetics that purports to elevate life into art or art into life, but rather an 
understanding that there is an indifference between life and art. Only a politics, 
Agamben (2001: 77) argues, that understands the fundamental indifference between 
both understands its true tasks (which is and should always be related to the 
community). The new political practice is about the organization of situations -  Guy 
Debord is never far away and neither is (silent) film and theatre -  in which you are 
willing to say, in Nietzsche’s sense, that you want this over and over again, if  necessary, 
countless times. The point is to completely change the world without violating or 
harming it, that is, you change the world by affirming it. Saying ‘yes’ to life as such 
entails that you refuse to exclude -  exclusion is, of course a way of saying ‘no’ (a ‘no’ 
to this particular group, a ‘no’ to an identity that differs from yours, a ‘no’ to your body 
or a ‘no’ to the animal in you). The refusal to exclude is based on a refusal to accept 
form or teleology.
In the society of the spectacle, we only organize with particular goals (telos) in mind. 
Even here, Plato and Aristotle are not too far away. For example, we want to obtain 
certain commodities in the hope that the quality of our lives will improve. As a 
consequence, we have lost our capacity for the gesture which is, Agamben (2001: 78) 
claims, exactly the other side of the commodity (for it totally lacks any use and 
exchange value). Paradoxically, however, in a society dominated by images and 
commodities, everybody becomes obsessed by the possibility of the gesture. Yet, what 
we have are oftentimes false gestures, that is, gestures “as foreign as the gesticulations 
of marionettes” (1999: 83). Nietzsche -  that is, the Nietzsche that Agamben makes him
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out to be -  understood this very clearly. His insistence on a life-affirming activity is a 
case in point:
[T]he eternal return is intelligible only as a gesture (and hence solely as a theatre) in which 
potentiality and actuality, authenticity and mannerism, contingency and necessity have become 
indistinguishable. Thus spoke Zarathustra is the ballet of a humanity that has lost its gestures. And 
when the age became aware of its loss (too late) it began its hasty attempt to recuperate its lost 
gestures in extremis. (Agamben, 1999: 83)
Beauty, Ethics, Gag
What we have here is a call for a politics that is about the creation of situations allowing 
for a gesture. To understand the power of this call, one should bear to mind that 
Agamben (2001: 77) defines capitalism (or the society of the spectacle) as a project that 
aims at the elimination of possibilities and potential from life itself or, perhaps better, at 
the elimination of chance -  and it has to achieve this by pushing everything into a well- 
defined directions. Agamben is in doubt about this project as it excludes the less-than- 
human of which he argues all ethics should be about. As we have just seen, he opts for a 
politics that effaces the distinction between the human and the non-human. I opened the 
article by saying that, for many philosophers, the key distinction between humans and 
non-humans is linked to an understanding that humans are capable of teleological 
activity. Now, Agamben’s strategy is to ponder the possibility of human action that is 
not teleological (and therefore not anthropological at all). We need a concept that allows 
us to escape from the ‘teleologische Setzung’ that Lukacs had in mind when he 
discussed the working animal. The gesture is exactly such a concept.
He (2001: 59) introduces a subtle distinction made by the Latin writer Varro between 
facere (making, creating), agere (acting, performing), and gerere (fulfilling, taking on). 
The idea is that, for example, a poet can create (faceré) a play without performing 
(agere) in it. The artist, on the other hand, can perform in the play without having 
created it. Now, Varro argues that the emperor in a country engages in an entirely 
different kind of activity: he neither creates nor performs but takes on certain 
responsibilities and fulfils duties. It is as if  he ‘carries’ a task, an office, and so on. This 
is referred to by the expression ‘res gerere’ (thing that is carried). How should we 
conceive of this carrying activity that Agamben describes as ‘gesture’?
First of all, it might be appropriate here to grasp the historical appeal of Agamben’s 
musings about the gesture. In the Roman Empire, politics was always about gestures. 
An oration by a politician in the Senate or in a stadium could obviously not be 
understood by all members of the audience for microphones had not been, as far as we 
can tell, invented yet. Good orators therefore knew that they were not understandable 
for many people. But when you cannot fully rely on the power of your voice, gestures 
become quintessential for your political performance. As Aldrete explains:
Gestures were an indispensable bale part of oratory and served many purposes. Hand and body 
motions could mirror the verbal component of an oration, impart emotional shadings to a word, 
serve as an alternative language for communication and enhance the innate rhythm nature of many 
orations. Gesture truly offered a way for Roman orators to achieve eloquence not only with their 
words but also with their entire bodies. (1999: 42-43)
38
© 2005 ephemera 5(1): 26-44
articles
On the Possibility of Formless Life
René ten Bos
Agamben’s reflections on the gestures are based on an understanding that politicians 
nowadays have lost the capacity for the gesture, not only in a literal but also in a figural 
sense. All we see on TV-screens are talking heads and mikes. We ought not to forget 
that the head is the pre-eminent site of the tic or the spasm -  it is the site of the non- 
gestural. No wonder then that (business) politics nowadays is not about beauty and 
eloquence anymore but about goal-setting, decisiveness, and toughness. Politics has 
therefore become a largely anaesthetic affair: it is not about beauty nor is it about the 
capacity to be affected or to be passionate (see also Nancy, 1991). All these elements 
are cancelled out by the project-nature (or, if  you like, managerial nature) that so much 
politics has assumed. When we glance at people like Blair and Bush, we sense in their 
highly programmed speeches and their spastic focus on pre-established goals that the 
syndrome of Gilles de la Tourette might be lurking behind all that they say: their speech 
as well as their behaviour betray the eclipse of the gesture. Flexibility -  that is a key 
element of the gesture -  is understood by them as a weakness, backbone is all that 
matters.
Second, there is a subtle philosophical argument as well. Agamben point out that 
Aristotle (1999: 185, 1140b) makes a famous distinction between poiesis (production) 
and praxis (acting): production always has a goal outside the activity of producing itself, 
whereas successful acting is always its own goal. It is this distinction, as I explained 
above, that has determined much thought about work and organization. On the one 
hand, there are activities that are means to realize certain extrinsic goals; on the other 
hand, there are activities that can do without means and are goals within themselves. 
Agamben (2001: 59-61) points out that both activities, poiesis and praxis, are 
dominated by the telos, that is, by some conceptualisation of goal, form, intention, and 
so on. (I have discussed this to some extent in the first section.)
The gesture, however, refers to activity that is liberated from the teleological 
straightjacket. Agamben describes the gesture as a means without end and he argues that 
we have to take this in the sense that it both refuses to become a means to an end and 
refuses to become an end in itself. He refers to the French poet Mallarmé who has 
referred to a similar principle in terms of a milieu pur and to Kant (2001: 61) who 
defined the entire domain of aesthetics, both in art and in nature, as “finality without 
end” (Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck, translated in Italian as: finalità senza scopa).
Now, for Kant it was quite clear that ethics is about ends. We cannot find goals outside 
ourselves (for example, in nature) and therefore we have to look for them in ourselves: 
the final end of our lives lies in our own moral destination (2001: 185). As Kant sees it, 
nature and art have a purely “formal finality” (2001: 79): in them, there is finalization, 
realization, actualisation, but there is no underlying end. This is indeed what defines 
beauty: it is “the form of finality in an object inasmuch as it can be perceived without 
the idea of an end” (2001: 93). For Kant, aesthetics and ethics are therefore separated: in 
the first domain only finality prevails and in the second domain, which is essentially 
human, there are (also) ends.
I take Agamben’s reflections about the gesture as a correction of Kantian (and, indeed, 
all teleological) schemes. The reason is that, like Plato and Aristotle, Kant has 
succumbed to the temptations of the anthropological machine: ethics is excluded from
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the non-human domain. We may think of a tiger or, to mention an example by Kant 
himself, of a tulip as beautiful, but they are not to be understood in any ethical sense. As 
I indicated earlier, for Agamben, ethics is precisely related to the non-human (or less- 
than-human) domain. I take him as saying that Kant was destined to be (morally) deaf 
for the voice of the non-human for he made such a rigid distinction between aesthetics 
(as something that can be related the non-human sphere) and ethics (as something that 
cannot be related to the non-human sphere). It is exactly this distinction that Agamben 
wants to overcome. The concept of the gesture allows him to unify aesthetics and ethics. 
The provocation is, of course, that we have here an ethics without ends. In Agamben’s 
view, ethics is neither about poiesis nor about praxis. Varro is important here for he 
opens up an old and almost entirely forgotten dimension of activity: a gesture shows 
(rather than says or, as Wittgenstein would say, zeigt rather than sagt) that one is willing 
to function as a means that remains uncontaminated by ends.
Yet, the gesture is not detached from the linguistic. Kommerell, to whom I referred 
earlier, claimed that the gesture is always an expressive showing of a person who makes 
us aware that s/he is somehow lost in the very language that s/he is able to use. As such, 
we may infer from this that the gesture is closely linked to language. Yet, it opens up to 
another side of language, to a kind of non-communicative speechlessness dwelling 
inside it: the more people struggle with words, the more they seem to be at a loss within 
these words. When we speak, it is as if  an unsayable labyrinth weighs us down. The 
person who makes a gesture might perhaps be argued to show us a way out of this 
linguistic labyrinth.
The gesture interrupts language precisely at the moment when it is actualising itself. To 
put it more clearly, the factum loquendi, that is, the fact that human beings are-in- 
language is what cannot be said, but is shown by the gesture. It shows language as pure 
communicability. But as pure communicability, there is no need to restrict language to 
humans. Communicability opens up a possibility of language that stretches further than 
the human voice and that is open for communication with non-human or less-than- 
human spheres as well. This is exactly why Agamben takes such a great interest in 
where communication seems to be a failure (at least from a rational-humanistic point of 
view): echolalia, stuttering, spastic behaviour, animal sounds, and so on. The gesture 
opens up to an ethos (a dwelling place) where communicative success cannot be 
guaranteed beforehand.
This allows Agamben to link the gesture to the idea of a ‘gag’. A gag, of course, is 
something that might be put into your mouth in order to prevent you from speaking. But 
it is also something that is linked to the mimic or theatrical. The struggle with speech 
can also be a silent improvisation of the artist. Here, we have an example of non­
language that is not without communicability. The gesture is not about communication 
but about communicability. The gesture should intercept the process of language which 
lies at the heart of the polis and replaces it by a formless communicability. “What unites 
human beings among themselves is not a nature, a voice, or a common imprisonment in 
signifying language; it is the vision of language itself and, therefore, of experiencing 
language’s limits, its end. A true community can only be a community that is not 
presupposed” (Agamben, 1999: 47, emphasis in original).
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Clearly, there are false gestures and pure gestures. It is in the latter that Agamben 
locates the sphere of a politics to come. Only, in an almost silent or, perhaps better, in a 
formless and nigh-to animal-like theatre are people able to go beyond representation and 
communication. Only there will they find communality.
Dancing
But where do we find examples of the gesture today? Are there people willing to 
abandon the sphere of necessity and to reduce themselves to pure means? The French 
philosopher Michel Guerin (1995) has distinguished four kinds of gestures: action, 
giving, writing, and dancing -  and he refers to the latter as the ‘pure gesture’ for we 
cannot think the other three without goals or ulterior motives. Dancing is so pure, 
Guerin adds, because we can immediately start with it and do not have to resort to 
deliberation and planning. Manning (2003) develops a similar argument in relationship 
to Argentine tango: she refers to it as a milieu which is entirely independent of pre­
ordained constraints. Precisely because these constraints are absent, an intensity and a 
sensibility that are alien to the objectivity of work become possible.
Guerin points out that the gesture is a meagre alternative for words. It is strongly 
context-dependent and always focused on what is vital or most important. This should 
not come as surprise for the gesture has not time or means to articulate itself in complex 
situations. This is why it can, contrary to language, hardly be corrected. Language is 
exuberant, wasteful, and shrouded, whereas the gesture is frugal and naked. This is not 
to imply that the gesture is subservient to language. We should not merely conceive of it 
as a kind of lesser language that provides us with additional information about, say, the 
personalities, interests, or feelings of those who speak. Indeed, the gesture is more than 
just gesticulation or body language for it seems to be impossible to distinguish meaning 
from behaviour. Like Agamben, Guerin points to the animalistic and sensual qualities of 
the gesture. Meaning coincides with behaviour, he argues, and becomes essentially 
detached from reflection and deliberation. It is almost as if  meaning becomes an 
animalistic willing-to-say that is closely akin to life itself. In this sense, the gesture 
escapes the realm of bodily techniques. Perhaps, Guerin suggests, it foreshadows or 
prefigures these techniques.
Animalistic and unreflective as it may be, Guerin (1995: 16) understands the gesture as 
the pedestal of tradition or culture. The dance is a goal-less activity that initiates and 
imitates. Its principle is technical, but its consequences are always symbolical. The 
dance evades the realm of the objective but this is exactly what allows it to create 
unexpected communalities. Blissfully indifferent to notions such as objectivity and 
profitability, it denies the established system, but it is this denial that causes it to express 
what it wants to express. The dance never imposes certain meanings upon us. Being its 
own expression, it rather proliferates meanings and therefore forms of togetherness 
(Newell, 1999: 16). In breaking through linguistic barriers, the dance has important 
political characteristics: it founds and creates communality. Manning relates the tango 
to a
politics of touch which engages in the means, that is, in the potential of listening to the breath, the 
body, the distance and the closeness of another human being, a listening to what might be 
considered the very ethics-in-deconstruction of humanity. (2003: section 15)
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Manning adds that tango is not about a fusion of two bodies in a kind of bestial ecstasy. 
Tango is not the same as dirty dancing. It rather expresses not only consensus with 
another body, a kind of sense-sharing if you like, but also a ‘dissensus’ with it, an 
impossibility to fuse with another body, a fundamental incommensurability. Gestures 
therefore do not so much perfect communication as betray that communication can 
never be perfected. This is, I suggest, how we might understand Agamben’s emphasis 
on communicativeness rather then on communication. Where the latter is infested with 
teleology, the former is merely means without end. Again, The Nietzschean inspiration 
should be clear here:
The human being is a rope tied between animal and superman, - a rope across an abyss. (...) What 
is great about the human being is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved about him is 
that he is a passage and a downfall. (Nietzsche, 1988: 16-17)
Zwicky (1992: 46) defines lyrics as a gesture that should simplify our being in the 
world. Perhaps, this can be said of all gestures. They might be the droplets that allow us 
to concentrate on the silence of water. The gesture aspires a unity with the world that is 
unavailable to average language users. To invoke a well-known Heideggerian theme, 
we chatter and chatter but the communality of two or more people is not based on this 
chatter. A silent glance in the eyes can be sufficient (Barthes, 2002), a dance or a 
delicious meal might do as well, perhaps a piece of music -  all these gestures create 
togetherness where language and organization fail. The lyrical gesture, Zwicky (1992: 
372) points out, does not have any temporal organization. Otherwise, it would become a 
merely domesticated and weakened kind of gesture. Due to its bestiality and wildness, 
“the gesture is an activity which shows us that we cannot live in communality if we 
have not anything in common with the world in which we live” (ibid.).
Thought
The politics of the gesture refers to a post-sovereign, non-exclusive, and affirmative 
politics. It is an anti-humanistic politics as it refuses to acknowledge a special status for 
human beings or for particular human beings. If humanism is worth a thing, then it 
should open up itself to spheres where humanity is at issue. That is to say, humanism 
can only be grounded in the non-human. This implies that we have to think about the 
communality between the human and the non-human or the less-than-human. That is, 
we have to overcome the anthropological machine.
This implies that we should give up ingrained conceptualisations of thinking. It is no 
longer an activity linked to a particular organ that is well developed among human 
beings. It is rather an experience the object of which is the potential character of life and 
of human reason. Agamben quotes Aristotle who defined thought as “being whose 
nature is to be in potency” (2001: 18). ‘Thought’, he writes a few lines earlier, “is what 
we call the tie which places life-forms in a connection that cannot be resolved” (2001: 
17). It is, in fact, an experience of a potential community in which no life whatsoever is 
excluded. It is about this experience that the politics of the gesture evolves. It has 
nothing to do with work. The politics that Agamben has in mind is a non-working 
practice that prefers thought, understood here as formless experiment, over the 
teleological positioning we know as labour.
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